We often hear the word "mentality" used to explain almost anything. From social problems to political stagnation, it has become a convenient catch-all phrase, a way of saying, "that's just the way we are." It implies a fixed, unchangeable essence baked into the soul of an entire people. But what if this powerful concept, which seems to explain so much, is actually a harmful illusion? What if the very idea of a collective, innate "national character" not only distorts reality but also holds us back?

The term itself has scientific roots, but its journey into popular use has twisted its meaning. It’s time we looked past this simplistic excuse and explored what truly shapes our societies and ourselves.

An Idea Born from a Mistake

The word "mentality" was introduced by French ethnologist Lucien Lévy-Bruhl. While studying tribal societies, he used the term to describe what he saw as fundamental differences in thinking between them and Europeans. Crucially, Lévy-Bruhl believed these traits were innate, a matter of inherent psychological wiring rather than a product of their environment or culture.

We now understand that he was profoundly mistaken.

Later, in the 1920s, the French Annales School of historians picked up the term but used it in a completely different way. They argued that a person's way of thinking was shaped by their historical era. The builder of the ancient pyramids and a modern city dweller would struggle to understand one another because their entire context—their knowledge, their beliefs, their daily realities—is radically different. This view is far more aligned with modern sociology.

The problem is, our everyday use of "mentality" has clung to the flawed, original meaning of an unchangeable national character, not the thinking of an era.

Deconstructing a Ghost

If we try to dissect the popular concept of "mentality," we find it’s built on shaky ground. It’s usually presented as a mix of three things: a spiritual component, a psychological one, and a cultural one.

When we talk about a nation’s “soul” or “spirit,” we are speaking in metaphors. Saying "my soul hurts" is a poetic way to describe complex emotional pain; we know it’s not a literal event happening in a measurable organ. The same applies to the notion of a collective national soul.

The psychological component—the idea of a unique mental structure for an entire people—is just as elusive. We simply cannot measure or prove the existence of these supposed innate traits.

What are we left with? Only the third component: culture. The observable differences between groups of people are not about a mystical shared mind, but about shared values, norms, and traditions. These are things we can actually study and see change.

The Real Harm of a Simple Label

Thinking in terms of "mentality" is more than just a bad habit; it's actively harmful. Firstly, it’s a direct path to prejudice. It assigns a person a pre-packaged set of qualities they are expected to live with, ignoring their individuality. We are not born with a fixed character; we are incredibly adaptive beings who both absorb and create the culture around us. Stereotypes put us in boxes and limit our potential.

Consider the famous stereotype of the angry, violent character we see in action films like Schwarzenegger’s Red Heat. If this is our only exposure to a certain nationality, we develop a prejudice without ever meeting a single person from that country.

The concept also crumbles under simple logic. What "mentality" would a person of Spanish heritage have if they've lived their entire life in France? The idea of an innate Spanish character is nonsensical when it's clear their language, social habits, and worldview would be overwhelmingly shaped by their French environment.

Perhaps most conveniently, "mentality" is the perfect excuse for inaction. Why do we have a certain recurring social problem? "It’s our mentality." It’s an easy way to shift responsibility away from failed policies, weak institutions, or our own collective choices. It’s an appeal to an invisible force that can’t be measured, yet can be blamed for anything.

If Not Mentality, Then What?

To say mentality doesn't exist isn't to say that all cultures are the same. Of course, there are distinct differences between ethnic and national groups. But these differences are rooted in tangible, dynamic forces—not in an unchangeable group soul.

• Norms and Values: These are the shared beliefs about what is good, right, and normal. But norms change. Not long ago, smoking in restaurants was perfectly acceptable; today, the idea seems bizarre to many. The norm shifted, proving it was never an innate part of a "mentality."
• Traditions: A tradition is a specific, repeated action, not a state of mind. Furthermore, traditions are constantly evolving and borrowing from each other. A modern wedding might blend ancient local rituals with an arch from an American movie—hardly the expression of a pure, timeless national character.
• Communicative Behavior: You’ve likely noticed that people in some cultures are more emotionally expressive, while others are more reserved. Italians might kiss on the cheek, Americans might smile freely at strangers, and people from other places might seem more stoic. These are not innate traits; they are learned codes of communication, absorbed from those around us.

The Real Drivers of Our World

A person's behavior is far more influenced by their education, the quality of their government, the strength of social institutions, and the rights and freedoms they possess than by any supposed "mentality." People within a single nation can be as different from one another as people from opposite ends of the earth.

If we look at actual data, the stereotypes often fall apart. For instance, the World Values Survey, a massive, long-running international study led by political scientist Ronald Inglehart, shows how values shift. In one major study, a nation widely stereotyped as being deeply spiritual was found to have values that were actually quite secular, with a strong emphasis on material security over freedom. The same nation, often labeled as "collectivist," in fact showed incredibly low levels of trust in both fellow citizens and public institutions.

This low trust isn't a mystical trait; it’s a rational response to history and circumstance. The widespread use of reinforced metal apartment doors, like something from a bank vault, isn't about "mentality." It's a visible sign of low social trust, perhaps born from a memory of past instability and a lack of faith in law enforcement.

The most powerful proof lies in examples like North and South Korea. Here we have the same people, from the same ethnic background. Yet, they have built two completely different worlds: one, a globally influential, technologically advanced democracy, and the other, an impoverished, isolated dictatorship. Their destinies were not shaped by some shared Korean "mentality," but by politics, economics, and freedom.

A simple rule should guide us: if someone tries to explain complex economic, political, or social failures with an appeal to something as vague and unprovable as "mentality," we should ask ourselves if we are being misled. We are not prisoners of a predetermined character. Our future is shaped not by a mythical mindset, but by the tangible reality we all have the power to change.

References

• Inglehart, R. (1997). Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies. Princeton University Press.

  This foundational book uses data from the World Values Survey to demonstrate how socioeconomic development systematically changes a society's values. It directly challenges the idea of static national cultures by showing a clear shift from "survival values" (emphasizing economic and physical security) to "self-expression values" (prioritizing subjective well-being, individual freedom, and quality of life). The analysis in Chapter 2, "The Rise of Postmodern Values," is particularly relevant to the article's discussion of how values can be measured and observed to change over time.

• Lévy-Bruhl, L. (1923). Primitive Mentality (Original French title: La mentalité primitive).

  This is the primary source for the concept of "mentality" as discussed in the article. Lévy-Bruhl argues for a "pre-logical" mentality in what he termed "primitive" societies, suggesting their thought processes were fundamentally different and less rational than those of modern Europeans. Reading his work directly exposes the origins of the idea that entire peoples have a distinct, inherent psychological makeup—a concept that anthropology and sociology have since largely rejected as ethnocentric and flawed.

• Febvre, L. (1982). The Problem of Unbelief in the Sixteenth Century: The Religion of Rabelais. Harvard University Press.

  A classic text from the Annales School of history, this book offers a powerful alternative to the concept of a static national mentality. Febvre argues that it was impossible for anyone in the 16th century, even the satirist Rabelais, to be an atheist in the modern sense because their entire "mental toolkit" (l'outillage mental) lacked the necessary concepts. He demonstrates how the mindset of an entire era is different, shaped by the knowledge and beliefs available at the time. This supports the article's point that "thinking" is tied to historical context, not to an unchanging national character.